To Hashem - Parashat Tzav 5779 - March 22, 2019

Our parasha, Parashat Tzav, continues from the description opened in last week’s parasha of the various offerings that were offered in the Tabernacle and in the Beit HaMikdash – the Temple in Yerushalayim.

One unique phrase is repeated time and again – le’Hashem – to Hashem: “a memorial offering to Hashem”, “that they will offer to Hashem”, “a pleasant odor to Hashem”, to name a few.

“To Hashem” is an ambiguous phrase. Does “to Hashem” convey the possessive case – as in G-d’s memorial offering? Alternatively, does “to Hashem” indicate the intended recipient – a memorial offering to G-d? Perhaps, “to Hashem” means something else. What is the meaning of the phrase “to Hashem”'? What does it add?

One example of a use of the phrase, “to Hashem”, is in the Passover offering that was celebrated in Egypt and is mentioned in the Seder. In Parashat Bo, the Torah says, “And thus you will eat it (the Pascal sacrifice): with your loins girded, your shoes on your feet and your staff in your hand; and you will eat it quickly, it is a Pesach offering – to Hashem.” A similar statement is made in the Seder – a Pesach offering to Hashem.

Rashi, commenting on the verse above, explains that the phrase – a Pesach offering to Hashem – means that even the manner in which the Pesach was eaten – hurriedly and prepared for travel – must convey the purpose of eating this sacrifice. The sacrifice is exclusively identified with the service of Hashem. To contextualize the enjoyment of eating the roasted lamb of the Pesach sacrifice, the Torah commands us to eat the Pesach in such a way as to convey its exclusive identification with the service of Hashem.

Returning to our parasha, the meaning of “to Hashem” is similar – the sacrificial service in the mishkan or in the Beit HaMikdash must be exclusively associated with the service of Hashem. Any foreign ideas or intents pollutes the sacrificial service and is idolatry.

Should not all mitzvot be described as “to Hashem”? Why are these sacrifices labeled with the demand of “to Hashem”? What type of situation demands the application of this principle of exclusivity in the service of Hashem?

All mitzvot are the product of Hashem’s will. Tzedakah, tzitzit, kashrut are all such examples. Regarding these mitzvot, one needs only to have proper intent for the mitzvah. For example, when we read the megilah on Purim, we had to have in mind that we were fulfilling that commandment. When we will eat matza on Pesach, we will need to have in mind that we are about to fulfill the mitzva of matza. The service is the performance of the mitzvah and that is all that is required. The mitzva does not directly touch on one’s notion of G-d. Even the mitzva of sippur yetziat mitzrayim – telling the story of our leaving Egypt – requires only the retelling of the Exodus story and the requisite praise of Hashem. Even one who does not have a completely accurate idea of Hashem may fulfill the mitzva.

However, some mitzvot touch on fundamental ideas of G-d. When we are called upon to make the most fundamental distinction – the distinction between Hashem and anything else – halacha requires exclusivity “to Hashem”. The institution of sacrifices is one such example. In this case, the Torah demands that the one who is serving Hashem must have a proper idea of Hashem in mind – he must be able to distinguish unambiguously between Hashem and all other notions of god. He must be able to distinguish unambiguously between service of Hashem and service of something other than Hashem.